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REPRODUCTION-POWERED INDUSTRY: COORDINATING AGENCY
REGULATIONS FOR SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
Brendan Parent*
The products of synthetic biology may improve medicine, national
security, environmental protection, and the economy, but
under-regulated development could catastrophically compromise
these endeavors. Considering the dangers exhibited by existing
microorganisms and public access to tools of synthetic biology
construction, the field's untested novelty implicates human health
and safety. Further, social justice concerns are raised by the
resources required to sustain a shift from a fossil fuel-based
economy to a biofuel-based economy. Current regulations are
insufficient to address these risks. Accordingly, regulations must
be modified through amendments coordinated between the
National Institutes ofHealth, the Environmental Protection Agency,
and the Food and Drug Administration. Interagency regulation
provides the strongest prospect for supporting beneficial
developments while protecting against hazards unique to the field
This Article provides a brief history of synthetic biology and
examines its public and private development. This Article also
examines its potential benefits and risks and current applicable
regulations, both national and international. It concludes with
propositions for regulatory modification, and attention is given to
domestic interagency regulation.
Brendan Parent is an Instructor in Medical Ethics at NYU Medical Center
and a Clinical Assistant Professor in the NYU Sports and Society Program. He
received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center, where he was
presented with the ABA Award for Excellence in Health Law. He would like to
thank Professor Ani Satz for her assistance with this Article, Jaydee Hanson and
Eric Hoffman for their insights, and his wife, Jane Pucher, for caring about
things like Synthetic Biology.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A new phase of production innovation is touting potential for
cheap and effective fuel, medicine, and virtually any other
essential product or device. The machines of this production are
literally more intelligent-they are living. Synthetic biology
involves programming and building bacteria and viruses to
produce diesel gas or synthetic fibers, or perform as poison sensors
or pollution eaters. The excitement stems from both the seemingly
limitless possibilities of exploiting genetic code and from the
potential for self-renewing production through cellular
reproduction. But, there is a complication with using cells as
machines. While the best production machines reliably generate
identical results with little maintenance, microorganisms
constantly change their forms and functions without warning.
Microorganisms adapt on their own terms, and the best scientists
have little clue how to control this.
Science and industry are at a pivotal juncture where promises
of clean, efficient, and sustainable bio-energy could overshadow
the dangers in manipulating cellular machinery for environmental
and human application. Those responsible for the research,
development, and packaging of synthetic biology disregard the
breadth and severity of these dangers.' Health and social justice
concerns need to be publicized and addressed by authoritative
powers. Financial constraints and pre-established regulatory roles
I Instead of taking measured steps to examine risks, synthetic biology's
primary proponents are using resources and actualizing products in ways that
increase the risk of unjust land use and public exposure to dangerous agents.
See Denise Caruso, Synthetic Biology: An Overview and Recommendations for
Anticipating and Addressing Emerging Risks, SCI. PROGRESS 5, 5-6 (2008);
Synthetic Solutions to the Climate Crisis: The Dangers of Synthetic Biology for
Biolfuels Production, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, 37 (Sept. 2010), available at
http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/93/59/9/529/1/SynBio-BiofuelsReport Web.
pdf. Craig Venter, a leading pioneer of synthetic biology called development of
synthetic biology "wise, warranted and restrained, which will help to ensure that
this young field of research will flourish in a positive manner." See Andrew
Pollack, U.S. Bioethics Commission Gives Green Light to Synthetic Biology,
N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/science/16synthetic.
html.
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for governing genetically engineered organisms prevent the
development of a new domestic supervisory entity from being a
realistic consideration. Instead, existing regulations of biotechnology
need to be modified and' supplemented through amended
regulations coordinated between the National Institutes of Health
("NIH"), the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), and the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to support beneficial
developments and protect against safety and social justice hazards
unique to synthetic biology. This Article proceeds accordingly:
Part II will provide a brief history of synthetic biology. Part III
will examine its public and private development. Part IV examines
its potential risks. Part V characterizes arguments that dismiss the
risks of synthetic biology and provides counter arguments. Part VI
discusses current national and international regulations. Part VII
proposes domestic interagency regulation to promote the field's
benefits and protect against its dangers. Finally, Part VIII
concludes by discussing the reasons that make interagency
regulation the best option.
II. DEFINITION AND BRIEF HISTORY
Understanding the principles of synthetic biology and its
commercial underpinnings is essential to the justification of a new
regulatory framework. Synthetic biology is "the design and
construction of new biological parts, devices and systems that do
not exist in the natural world and also the redesign of existing
biological systems to perform specific tasks."2 Scientists in this
burgeoning field intend to "create a programmable microorganism
from scratch,"' and some claim "the horizon is 'the industrialisation
of biology.' "4 These aspirations are made possible by recombinant
2 See JIM THOMAS, EXTREME GENETIC ENGINEERING: AN INTRODUCTION TO
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 1 (2007), available at http://www.etcgroup.org
/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/602/01/synbioreportweb.pdf.
Arjun Bhutkar, Synthetic Biology: Navigating the Challenges Ahead, 8
J. BIOLAW & Bus. 2,20 (2005).
4 Dorothee Browaeys, The Industrialisation of Biology, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE-ENGLISH EDITION (Oct. 2010), available at http://mondediplo.
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DNA technology, or "gene splicing," which over the past
thirty-five years has influenced health outcomes,' the design of
cosmetics,' agricultural practices,' and the potential for biowarfare.'
The identification of genes that encode for practical functions like
production of bioluminescence, pesticide, and insulin led to the
development of tools that can isolate, cut, transfer, and insert these
genes from one organism to another.' Genetic technology has
greatly improved over time; for example, scientists no longer have
to extract desirable genetic sequences from organisms, but can
com/2010/10/11biology (quoting Richard Kitney, head of the department of
biological and medical systems at Imperial College London).
5 See Paul Berg, Herbert W. Boyer, and Stanley N. Cohen, CHEM. HERITAGE
FOUND. (2010), http://www.chemheritage.org/discover/online-resources/
chemistry-in-history/themes/pharmaceuticals/preserving-health-with-
biotechnology/berg-boyer-cohen.aspx.
6 See Robert Fedi6 et al., The Silk of Lepidoptera, 71 J. INSECT BIOTECH. &
SERICOLOGY 1, 3 (2002) (explaining that silk worms have been genetically
en ineered to produce better silk-based additives for cosmetics).
Keith R. Schneider & Renee Goodrich Schneider, Genetically Modified
Food, INST. OF FOOD AND AGRIC. ScI., UNIV. OF FLA. (2002), http://
edis.ifas.ufl.edu/fs084. All genetically modified foods are the product of gene
splicing. Id.
8 See generally Lawrence F. Roberge, Black Biology-A Threat to Biosecurity
and Defense, 2 BIOSAFETY 1 (2013), available at http://www.
omicsgroup.org/joumals/black-biologya-threat-to-biosecurity-and-biodefense-
2167-0331.1000el39.pdf (explaining that "Black biology is the use of genetic
engineering to enhance the virulence of a pathogen," an increasingly easy
method for terrorist groups and lone individuals to use as weapons).
9 Memorable pieces of this history include: 1) Rats that glow in the dark, see
Matthew Herper, Biotech's Glowing Breakthrough, FORBES (July 26, 2001),
http://www.forbes.com/2001/07/26/0726gfp.html; 2) Bt delta endotoxin-
resistant corn ("Bt corn"), see Richard Hellmich et al., Use and Impact of Bt
Maize, 10 NATURE EDUC. KNOWLEDGE 4, 4 (2012), available at
http://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/use-and-impact-of-bt-maize-
46975413; and 3) laboratory-manipulated bacteria that provide an essential
hormone for diabetics, see Suzanne Junod, Celebrating a Mileston: FDA 's
Approval of First Genetically Engineered Product, FDA (Apr. 2009), available
at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/Selections
FromFDLIUpdateSeriesonFDAHistory/ucm081964.htm.
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synthesize them in a lab.' By 2005, leading researchers had
assembled whole genomes of the poliovirus and the 1918 Spanish
influenza virus entirely from lab-synthesized nucleic acid
sequences." Only three years later, Craig Venter1 2 of the J. Craig
Venter Institute ("JCVI") advanced from viruses to bacteria by
assembling the first 600,000 base-pair length genome of
M Genitalium." In 2010, after many years of unsuccessful trials,
JCVI took their lab-assembled M Mycoides genome, inserted it
into an emptied M Capricolum cell, and created the first
self-replicating cell completely controlled by synthetic genes.1
JCVI's achievement was not recognized for producing a unique
or useful bacterium, but it provides a valuable forecast for future
endeavors. Without carefully examining the DNA, their
lab-created bacteria would appear virtually identical to naturally
occurring M. Mycoides. The only genetic differences were excised
pathogenic genes and a few inserted "genetic watermarks"
10 See generally Alan Villalobos et al., Gene Designer-A Synthetic Biology
Tool for Constructing Artificial DNA Segments, 7 BIOINFORMATICs 285 (June
2006).
1 See Gabrielle Samuel et al., Back to the Future: Controlling Synthetic Life
Sciences Trade in DNA Sequences, 66 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 5,
10(2010).
12 Venter is one of the most celebrated scientists in contemporary genomic
research. He has founded several companies for the research of genomics and
the development of genomic technologies. He is known for pushing scientific
boundaries that raise serious ethical issues about human and environmental
safety and about the proper role of humans in the creation and manipulation of
life. See Biographies: J Craig Venter, J. CRAIG VENTER INST.,
http://www.jcvi.org/cms/about/bios/jcventer/?emx=22 (last visited Oct. 3,
2013); Susan Okie, Is Craig Venter Going to Save the Planet? Or is This More
Hype from One ofAmerica's Most Controversial Scientists?, WASH. POST (Aug.
11, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-08-1 l/lifestyle/35269880 1
synthetic-genomics-elgae-craig-venter.
13 See MICHAEL RODEMEYER, NEW LIFE, OLD BOTrLES: REGULATING FIRST
GENERATION PRODUCTS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 17 (Woodrow Wilson Int'l Ctr.
for Scholars 2009).
14 See Press Release, J. Craig Venter Institute, First Synthetic Self-Replicating
Bacterial Cell (May 20, 2010), available at http://www.jcvi.org/cms/press/press-
releases/full-text/article/first-self-replicating-synthetic-bacterial-cell-
constructed-by-j-craig-venter-institute-researcher/.
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representing Venter's and his Colleagues' names and James Joyce
quotes.'" Although genetic engineering endeavors had produced
viable organisms with excised genes for several years," this was
different. The excitement over JCVI-synl.0, as Venter describes
in press conferences, is that "[its] parent is a computer." 7 The
ability to create a living cell without harvesting naturally occurring
genes substantially widens design prospects." To understand the
implications of this feat, it must be considered in context of other
contemporary genetic engineering endeavors.
There are several companies across the globe that are
redesigning bacteria for specific purposes,19 but the point at which
the science behind their practices moves from conventional genetic
engineering to synthetic biology is not clear. These companies are
modifying bacteria using laboratory-synthesized genes to produce
desired functionality, which is certainly the basis for the new field.
However, it is uncertain how much synthetic DNA is required to
deem the organism synthetic. One company heading down the
synthetic path is Amyris, which has engineered yeast to produce
Artemisinin, a chemical used in the treatment of Malaria
15 See Robert Lee Hotz, Scientists Create Synthetic Organism, WALL ST. J.
(May 21, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487035590
04575256470152341984.html.
16 Knockout mice are an example of organisms with excised genes; these
animals simplify studying causes and effects of specific genes. See Knockout
Mice, NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., http://www.genome.gov/
12514551 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
17 See Nicholas Wade, Researchers Say They Created a 'Synthetic Cell', N.Y.
TIMES (May 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/science/21cell.html.
Using existing genes limits the designer to the functions for which the genes
encode; designing original genes ostensibly allows the designer to encode for
previously unknown functions or immensely improved functions. See Hidden
Genetic Code for Better Designer Genes, SCIENCE DAILY (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/09/130926143236.htm.
19 See Number of Synthetic Biology Firms Tripled Over Last Four Years,
GENOME WEB (May, 2, 2013), http://www.genomeweb.com/number-synthetic-
biology-firms-tripled-over-last-four-years.
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previously only found in Sweet Wormwood.20 Another company
approaching synthetic biology is Joule Unlimited, which has
modified cyanobacteria to convert sunlight and carbon dioxide into
alkane, a component of diesel fuel. 21 Many researchers and
companies support the endeavor, proclaiming they are "not trying
to imitate nature," but rather they are "trying to supplement
nature."22 Furthermore, they claim they are "building the modem
chemical factories of the future."2 3 In light of these sentiments, the
objectives of genetic engineers become clear: in harnessing the
power of genetics, scientists intend to create wholly original
organisms to supplement, enhance, and ultimately replace current
commercial production methods. Venter's cell sets the precedent
for scientific confidence in ground-up design of these biological
factories, which scientists intend to customize and control with
precision. For some, the goals go even further: Drew Endy of
Stanford speculates that within twenty years, human genomes will
be synthesized completely from scratch.24
Emerging examples of synthesized genomes and engineered
organisms, fantasies of biology-based economies, contractual
partnerships relying on these fantasies, and public access to genetic
information and tools should all be considered in the context of
preserving health, relationships, and environmental integrity. The
ways in which synthetic biology presents unique threats to these
20 See ERIK PARENS ET AL., ETHICAL ISSUES IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATES 1, 14 (Woodrow Wilson Int'l Ctr. for Scholars
2009).
21 See Matthew L. Wald, Biotech Company to Patent Fuel Secreting Bacteria,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/14/science/
earth/1 4fuel.html.
22 See Andrew Pollack, Scientists Are Starting to Add Letters to Life's
Alphabet, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/24/
science/scientists-are-starting-to-add-letters-to-life-s-alphabet.html?pagewanted
=all&src=pm (quoting Floyd E. Romesburg of the Scripps Research Institute).
23 Robert Sanders, Keasling and Cal: A Perfect Fit, U.C. BERKELEY NEWS
(Dec. 13, 2004), http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/12/13
keasling.shtml (quoting Jay Keasling of the U.C. Berkeley's California Institute
for Quantitative Biomedical Research, and of Amyris Biotechnologies).
24 See THOMAS, supra note 2, at 10.
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assets should guide implementation of new domestic and
international biotechnology regulations.
III. PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT
Researchers at discrete edges of synthetic biology are
designing competing models for development-public and
private-that bear different risks that need to be addressed by
regulation. This section addresses these models and their risks.
This Article will refer to the "Open Source" model, which is
propounded by Drew Endy and Tom Knight through the Biobrick
Registry25 and International Genetically Engineered Machine
("iGEM") competition.26 Under this framework, unrestricted access
to tools, materials, and information could have the potential to
promote creation and sharing among established scientists as well
as do-it-yourselfers. This is juxtaposed to start-ups that are
hoarding patents in private partnerships with major corporations.27
Assisted by their contracted researchers, these start-up companies
likely intend to be the proprietors of synthetic biology-based fuels,
rubber, cosmetics, and vaccines. In the future, case law and
agency-issued guidelines and regulations must reconcile these
divergent paths by determining what aspects of synthetic biology
should be encouraged in public development and which may be
safely left to market forces. Currently, there is insufficient
oversight of both public and private sectors.
25 See Our Philosophy, REGISTRY OF STANDARD BIOLOGICAL PARTS,
http://parts.igem.org/Help: Philosophy (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
26 The iGEM competition grew out of a month-long summer bacterial design
course at MIT and has become Endy and Knight's annual undergraduate
competition. See Synthetic Biology Based on Standard Arts, IGEM, http://
igem.org/About (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) [hereinafter IGEM].
27 Corporate examples include Exxon, BP, and Dupont. See Alok Jha, Gene
Scientist to Create Algae Biofuel with Exxon Mobil, GUARDIAN U.K. (July 14,
2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/14/green-algae-exxon-
mobil; Robert Sanders, BP selects U.C. Berkeley to lead $500 Million Energy
Research Consortium with Partners Lawrence Berkeley National Lab,
University of Illinois, U.C. BERKELEY NEWS (Feb. 1, 2007); THOMAS, supra
note 2, at 20.
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A. Public Development
The Open Source movement is the core of public development;
it places disconcerting power in the hands of amateurs. Biobricks
and the iGEM competition are pillars of Open Source
development.2 8 Now entering its eighth year, 223 teams will be
competing in iGEM using "biobricks"29 to design unique bacteria
to be compared in several categories. Previous winning entries
included toxin-sensing cyanobacteria and "light-emitting cells"
that acted as a bio-screen emulating movement.30 The database
from which the genetic components are drawn is the Biobrick
registry, another contemporarily developed Endy/Knight
endeavor."1 The registry was designed as a public access central
repository for information regarding "standardized genetic
materials and associated functional information."3 2 This system
has been compared to the Linux software model where collective
efforts of thousands of developers contribute to an ever-improving
platform encouraging broad design participation. DNA strand-
synthesis technology is becoming ubiquitous in reasonably
well-equipped genetic research laboratories, but for those without
such equipment, companies like Integrated DNA Technologies
make custom strands to order.34 The production price of DNA has
28 See Alla Katsnelson, Open Source Synthetic Biology, THE SCIENTIST (Nov. 3,
2007), http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/25646/title/Open-
source-synthetic-biology/.
29 Biobricks are "a standard for interchangeable parts, developed with a view
to building biological systems in living cells . . . [they] can be assembled to form
useful devices, through a process often referred to as 'Standard Assembly.'
BioBrickTM parts are composable; allowing endless numbers of BiobrickTM parts
to be pieced together to form complex systems." See Help: An Introduction to
Biobricks, REGISTRY OF STANDARD BIOLOGICAL PARTS, http://parts.igem.org/
Help:AnIntroduction toBioBricks (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
30 See Andrew Torrance, Synthesizing Law for Synthetic Biology, 11 MINN. J.
L. SCi.& TECH. 629, 630-31 (2010).
31 See iGEM, supra note 26.
32 See The BioBrickTM User Agreement Version 1.0, BioBRICKS FOUND.,
https://biobricks.org/bpa/users/agreement/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
3 See THOMAS, supra note 2, at 34.
34 See gBlocks Gene Fragments, INTEGRATED DNA TECH. http://wwwidtdna.
com/pages/products/genes (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
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dropped substantially, from thirty dollars per base pair to one
dollar per base pair in the last ten years." As a result, the public
database of gene functions and access to DNA synthesis give
researchers at any level the ability to swiftly test gene
combinations in the modification of organisms.
Synthetic biology activity in the nonprofessional realm is
substantial. "Biopunk" is a culture of do-it-yourselfers, or
"biohackers," with significant web presence." Usability of the
biobrick registry is increased by other free web-based information,
such as the Synthetic Biology Primer, written by Scott Mohr, a
chemist at Boston University specializing in Nucleic Acid
interactions." Web forums for sharing information about biohacks
include biopunk.org, biohack.sf.net, and openwetware.org, where
tinkerers can share links to contemporary news, ask and answer
questions about gene splicing, and share their genetic hacks for
simple light-up bacteria and even health treatments. For example,
on biopunk.org a teenager agitated by a friend's complaints about
having celiac disease provided a series of links. The contributor,
who spent twenty minutes doing this research, claimed to be
providing the means to design gastrointestinal bacteria that will
"cure" the friend's condition. In the writer's words, "Problem
Freakin' Solved."3
An institutionally-approved version of biohacking is the iGEM
competition, which demonstrates the intersection between public
3 RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 16.
36 See Biopunk, BIOPUNK, http://www.biopunk.org/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2013);
Biopunks Tinker with the Building Blocks of Life, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 19,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/22/13646404 1/biopunks-tinker-with-the-
building-blocks-of-life.
37 Scott Mohr, Primer for Synthetic Biology, OPENWETWARE (July 18, 2007),
available at http://openwetware.org/images/3/3d/SB Primer 100707.pdf; Scott
Mohr, Bos. UNIV., http://www.bu.edu/chemistrylfaculty/mohr/ (last visited Nov.
3, 2013).
38 Andrew Maynard, Synthetic Biology, Ethics and the Hacker Culture, 2020
SCIENCE (June 13, 2008), http://2020science.org/2008/06/13/8613-synthetic-
biology-ethics-and-the-hacker-culture/ (citing Kanzure, On the State of
BioDIY/Biopunk Culture, BIOPUNK (Mar. 19, 2008), http://www.biopunk.org/
on-the-state-of-biodiy-biopunk-culture-t36.html).
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and private development. The rapid growth of the contest, from
twelve teams in 2004 to over 200 internationally in 2013, is a
testament to the growth of synthetic biology's Open Source
development.3 Even though many of the competition projects
appear to be novelties testing the limits of biological manipulation,
venture capitalists and companies are expressing great interest in
the student creations that demonstrate more practical applications.40
This appears to be the manifestation of Endy's intentions-to build
simplicity and accessibility into the field of synthetic biology and
ultimately encourage participation at all levels. 41 However, Endy's
stated goals are difficult to reconcile with the fact that he was once
co-founder of a now-defunct all-service synthetic biology company,
Codon Devices. Codon Devices once held an extensive patent
portfolio and advertised that the company's policy is to
"aggressively pursue patent protection for most of our proprietary
technology, and protect other aspects of our proprietary technology
as trade secrets."42
B. Private Development
Several companies and universities have been granted
proprietary genetic ownership and are capitalizing on businesses'
hunger for profit innovation while ignoring safety and equality
concerns. 43 Researchers, on behalf of their companies and
universities, hold patents on bacterial genes, including
representatives of University of California, Harvard University,
Temple University, Egea Biosciences, and Genencor." Several
labs are using their exclusive technology rights as leverage to
barter for development deals with industry leaders. For example,
39 See Projected Growth in iGEM Through 2015, IGEM, http://2011.igem.org/
Regions/iGEM_Growth (last visited Oct 3, 2013).
40 See THOMAS, supra note 2, at 17.
41 See id. at 34.
42 Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle,
85 TEX. L. REv. 1745, 1761 (2007) (quoting Intellectual Property, CODON
DEVICES, http://codon devices.com/science.aspx?id= 118).
43 See THOMAS, supra note 2, at 35.
44 See id.
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Exxon has invested $600 million with Craig Venter's Synthetic
Genomics, and BP has invested $500 million in Lawrence
Berkeley Labs to develop biofuels.4 5 Solazyme has signed a deal
with Unilever to replace palm oil with an algal-based oil and
another deal with the United States Navy to deliver 150,000
gallons of algal-based biofuel to supplement the military branch's
primarily used fuel. 46 Genencor is working under chemical
manufacturer Dupont and is engineering E. coli to produce key
components of a "spandex-like fib[er]."4 7 Synthetic Genomics
Vaccines, Inc.48 recently announced a three-year collaboration with
Novartis to develop influenza seed strains for vaccine
manufacturing.4 9
The budding technology's proven applications must cover vast
ground to catch up with the hype. For several years now, the U.S.
Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of Defense, and others
have sunk hundreds of millions of public and private dollars into
research, but not a single commercial project has come to
fruition." Several companies have gone bankrupt because they
were unable to keep up the rouse of viable production being "just
around the corner" during the investment skepticism of the recent
45 iha, supra note 27; Sanders, supra note 27.
46 Join The Navy and Free the World: A Special Report on Military Biofuels,
BIOFUELs DIGEST (Sept. 15, 2010), http://biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2010
/09/15/join-the-navy-and-free-the-world-a-special-report-on-military-biofuels/;
Paul Sonne, To Wash Hands ofPalm Oil Unilever Embraces Algae, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 15, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001142405274870372000
4575477531661393258.html.
47 THOMAS, supra note 2, at 20.
48 Synthetic Genomics Vaccines, Inc. is one of Craig Venter's enterprises.
About Us, SYNTHETIC GENOMICS, http://www.syntheticgenomics.com/about/
(last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
49 Press Release, Synthetic Genomics, Inc., SGVI Announces Collaboration
With Novartis on the Development of Influenza Vaccines Using Synthetic
Genomics Technologies (Oct. 7, 2010), available at http://www.
syntheticgenomics.com/media/press/10071 0.html.
5o See generally Paul Voosen, Synthetic Biology Comes Down to Earth,
CHRON. REv. (Mar. 4, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/Synthetic-Biology-
Comes-Down/137587/ (explaining that $1.84 billion has been invested in
synthetic biology, but no significant breakthroughs have been made).
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market crash. " In short, the field is young and bio-based
commercial production is possible, but it is likely that expectations
are too high for such a poorly understood science.
Regulation is also weak. As will be discussed in Part VI, no
current laws require synthetic biology production methods to
guarantee safety or efficacy. It is also difficult to believe that the
concerns of civil society could cause Venter to pause when a trial
phase of fuel-excreting algae produces less than predictable results.
Manufacturers, thus, have limited incentive to acknowledge and
address production risks. When faced with a $600 million check
riding on a looming deadline, bacteria that appear to be doing its
designed job, even in an unanticipated manner or rate, may be
deemed sufficient for production and ultimately consumer use.
"Economic imperative and lack of coordinated regulatory structure
beyond basic laboratory compliance have propelled this field at an
unprecedented rate without substantial discussion of the risks and
benefits . . . ."52
The potential concentration of power is also a serious concern.
For example, Venter applied for patents on the construction
process of Synthia, the first synthetic-genome controlled cell."
Although the creation is a "proof of concept," the patent office
may find the process demonstrating sufficient utility in light of
advances in gene splicing to grant ownership.54 If this is the case,
JCVI will have exclusive rights to the field of synthetic biology.
5 1Kristie Prinz, Biotech Companies Filing for Bankruptcy in Bad Economy,
CAL. BIOTECH L. BLOG (Nov. 21, 2008), http://califomiabiotechlaw.com/
archives/biotech-industry-news/biotech-companies-filing-for-bankruptcy-in-
bad-economy/.
52 Brendan Parent, Report on the Unintentional Physical Dangers of Synthetic
Biology delivered to the Presidential Comm'n for the Study of Bioethical Issues
(Oct. 1, 2010) (on file with author) (citing Denise Caruso, Synthetic Biology: An
Overview and Recommendations for Addressing and Anticipating Emerging
Risks, SC. PROGRESS (2008), available at http://www.scienceprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/ 1/syntheticbiology.pdf).
5 Will j Craig Venter's Patents Protect Novel Life Forms?, IP FRONTLINE
(May 26, 2010), http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=24290&
deptid=6.
54 Id.
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This kind of monopoly would be devastating for the numerous
companies and investors trying to advance the technology and
would put a definitive cap on Open Source contributions. The
risks of development posed by established genetic engineering
pioneers as well as garage do-it-yourselfers could be both deep and
broad. Thus, the burden of responsible development seems too
great to place in one corporation's hands.
IV. POTENTIAL HARMS
Potential harms of synthetic biology that should be addressed
through regulation can be divided roughly into "intentional" and
"unintentional" categories. Intentional harms can develop from the
malicious use of virulently designed pathogens. Unintentional
harms can further be divided into what the Hastings Center
describes as "physical" and "nonphysical" harms." Non-physical
harms include long-term unequal access to the technology and
socioeconomic displacement through eliminating jobs and
occupying land." These harms would arise from the prioritization
of development over the protection of people and communities
where development takes place. These harms could manifest even
if synthetic biology generates safe and beneficial products.
Another non-physical harm is the symbolic concern of humanity's
relationship with nature as implicated in the ability to design and
own living beings. 5 Unintentional physical harms are often
referred to as "bioerror."" These "bioerrors" include potential for
accidental release of organisms from a laboratory and commercial
release from production facilities that result in the modified
5 David Rejiski, Preface, in PARENS, supra note 20.
56id
5 See Press Release, ETC Group, Synthia Is Alive .. .And Breeding: Panacea
or Pandora's Box? (May 20, 2010) available at http://www.etcgroup.org/
sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf file/ETCVenterSynthiaMay20201
0.pdf).
58 Effects on Development in Synthetic Genetics, Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong., 46-49 (2010) (statement of Dr. Gregory
Kaebnick, Research Fellow at The Hastings Center).
59 See Andrew Leonard, ETC Group Warns Against "Bio-error", SALON (Jan.
19, 2007, 3:54 PM), http://www.salon.com/2007/01/19/etc-responds toendy/.
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organisms interacting with the environment so as to create negative
ecological or health consequences. All of these harms require
serious consideration in the implementation of the appropriate
regulatory infrastructure.
A. Intentional Malicious Dangers
The use of synthetic biology to cause intentional harm requires
access to both information and tools. Such access is difficult to
regulate. In the digital age, even young children in remote regions
of the world have the capacity to transfer vast amounts of
information across the globe with minimal clicking. Information is
far more difficult to regulate than is the use and sale of equipment.
As genetic understanding improves, the tools for assembling
genomes and building cells might become easier to make, such that
the parts for building DNA synthesis machines soon might become
as easy to order as gene fragments are today. Accordingly,
regulatory attention must be dedicated to both synthetic biology
information and tools to prevent bio-terror.
The ease of synthesizing pathogens has been demonstrated
repeatedly. Viruses have significantly shorter genomes, so
stability issues are less prevalent when assembling their gene
fragments. Furthermore, building such organisms is becoming less
complicated. In 2002, researchers synthesized the poliovirus in a
lab; in 2005 the researchers reconstructed the 1918 Spanish flu;
and in 2008 researchers created a bat version of SARS-which is
closely related to the human infection. 60 Eckard Wimmer of
SUNY at Stony Brook, responsible for generating the poliovirus
from mail-ordered genes, explains that the ease of access and
design is a "wake up call" " because he has recreated the
experiment six times and each time the work is "easier and
faster."6 2 The sequence for the 1918 flu virus was published in
60 See Samuel et al., supra note 11, at 10.
61 THOMAS, supra note 2, at 23 (quoting Joby Warrick, Custom-Built
Pathogens Raise Bioterror Fears, WASH. POST (July 31, 2006), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/30/AR2006073
000580.html).
62 THOMAS, supra note 2, at 23.
322 [VOL. 15: 307
Reproduction-Powered Industry
Nature and details of the virus reconstruction were published in
Science." This feat was met with criticism from both watchdog
civil society members as well as voices sympathetic to
biotechnology. Ray Kurzweil and Bill Joy, both avid self-proclaimed
"transhumanists" " called the publication of the flu virus
reconstruction "foolish" and similar to publishing the precise
designs for the atomic bomb.65
Concerns regarding intentional use dangers are the most
obvious and commonly voiced, but sufficient protections are not
close to being implemented. Some DNA segment manufacturers,
like Blue Heron, voluntarily screen orders for potentially
dangerous combinations." This kind of self-regulation is a small
step, but without collaboration between gene providers, it is of
little value. A 2005 study by New Scientist showed that five of
twelve gene manufacturers performed some regulatory screening,
with only five screening every sequence that they receive." Even
if most of these companies began screening their own products in
63 Andreas von Bubnoff, The 1918 Flu Virus is Resurrected, 437 NATURE 794,
794-95 (2005); Terrence M. Tumpey et al., Characterization of the
Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Flu Pandemic Virus, 310 SCIENCE 77,77 (2005).
6 Transhumanism, more recently known as "Humanity Plus," is a social and
cultural movement embracing science and technology as means to directly
improve mental and physical capacities. See About, HUMANITY+,
http://humanityplus.org/about (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). Another prominent
transhumanist figure is Larry Page, co-founder of Google. See Nathan Ingraham,
Larry Page wants to 'set aside a part of the world' for unregulated
experimentation, THE VERGE (May 15, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/
2013/5/15/4334356/larry-page-wants-to-set-aside-a-part-of-the-world-for-
experimentation; Ashlee Vance, Merely Human? That's So Yesterday, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 2010) (describing Page's co-founding of the Singularity
University, an institution which promotes achieving superhuman abilities and
defying death).
THOMAS, supra note 2, at 24 (quoting Ray Kurzweil & Bill Joy, Recipe for
Destruction, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/10/17/opinion/1 7kurzweiljoy.html? r-0).
66 CRAIC COMPUTING, BLACKWATCH: SOFTWARE TO IDENTIFY SEQUENCES
FROM HAZARDOUS BIOLOGICAL AGENTS 3 (2003), available at
http://biotech.craic.com/blackwatch/BlackWatch Datasheet.pdf.
67 See Peter Aldhous, The Bioweapon is in the Post, NEW SCIENTIST 8 (Nov.
12, 2005).
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the last eight years, "distributive purchasing" could circumvent red
flags triggered by suspect gene combinations ordered from an
individual provider. Ultimately, it will be impossible to prevent all
malicious or harmfully careless do-it-yourself projects when any
consumer can order from multiple sources.
Publicized pathogen design plans, easily ordered genetic
sequences, and manuals like Mohr's Primer for Synthetic Biology
should call attention to major regulatory gaps." Accordingly, a
centralizing effort akin to a DNA clearinghouse should be
entertained, where a single facility screens all DNA orders from all
providers.6 9 Public dissemination of gene information such as the
biobrick registry should be appropriately constrained until
monitoring technology is sufficient to implement this type of
unified regulation.
B. Unintentional Dangers
Unintentional dangers of synthetic biology are comprised of
harms that producers overlook while pursuing the creation of
beneficial products, processes, and/or profit. These harms are not
generally the result of malicious actors, unlike intentional dangers
discussed in the subsequent section. Three forms of unintentional
dangers will be discussed here: symbolic concern, threats to social
justice, and physical dangers.
1. Symbolic Concern
Of the unintentional use dangers, the impact of nonphysical
harms would be least immediate. For example, those who believe
the creation of life should solely be the province of greater powers
might view engineering organisms as "playing God." Synthetic
biology, thus, unintentionally conflicts with their values. 70
68 See generally Howard Wolinsky, Kitchen Biology, 10 EMBO REPORTS 683,
684-85 (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
2727445/pdf/embor2009145.pdf (describing the concern that "amateur science
[synthetic biology] is moving faster than regulators and legislators").
69 See Samuel et al., supra note 11, at 15.
70 This conflict is unintentional because it is highly unlikely that any synthetic
biology practice is undertaken with the goal of subverting religious beliefs.
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Although this concern is substantial, addressing it with regulatory
changes will be difficult because this particular harm does not
directly manifest in health, economic, or environmental
consequences. Affronts to personal beliefs are generally left for
sorting out among individuals in the private sphere beyond the
reach of the law."
There is also the possibility that the normalization of
manipulating life at the synthetic cell level could lead to
undesirable social changes. There may be decreased respect for
the natural development of life, as individuals feel entitled to assert
greater control over the biological development of humans.72 But
this fear can be alleviated if careful attention is paid to more
immediate concerns. Refining synthetic biology regulation efforts
to protect human dignity by preempting social justice concerns (i.e.,
tailoring development to avoid disparity increases in human
treatment and access to resources)" will almost certainly prevent
long-term negative social consequences posed by "playing God."
Policies enacted to protect communities from the negative effects
of synthetic biology on the environment would likely indicate
social sentiment against using synthetic biology to design humans.
However, all concerns should remain secondary to the risks of
physical harms. It would be irresponsible to solely address
symbolic and social justice concerns before enacting regulations
that can guarantee safety of synthetic biology products and
71 If the development of synthetic biology interferes with basic tenets of
respected faiths-and thus daily social life-such development may need to be
examined for First Amendment violations.
72 Recall claims from synthetic biology proponents about supplementing
nature and synthesizing human genomes from scratch. See Pollack, supra note
22 ("We're not trying to imitate nature; we're trying to supplement nature . . .)
(quoting Dr. Floyd Romesburg); see also THOMAS, supra note 2, at 10
(speculating that "within 20 years human genomes will be synthesized from
scratch" (quoting Drew Endy)).
7 See Jeff Conant & Eric Hoffman, Synthetic Biology and the "Bioeconomy
Feeding Fuel to the Fire of Landgrabs and Biodiversity Loss, FRIENDS OF THE
EARTH (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.foe.org/news/archives/ 2013-02-synthetic-
biology-and-the-biocconomy-feeding-fuel-to.
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processes, as intended by the regulatory suggestions later in this
Article.
2. Threats to Social Justice
The threats to social justice74 are pressing in light of the
extraordinary resource transformation and redistribution that would
need to occur to support the biofactory/biofuel-based economy
envisioned by researchers and their investment partners. Although
synthetic biology promises cheaper and more efficient production,
cultivation of synthetic cells for biofuel will require land, energy,
and labor." The most prominent dilemma is that the scale of
transition from current fuels to biofuels would be enormous. The
new extraction, maintenance, and upkeep methods would likely
require different labor and energy inputs. This shift will place
immense burdens on strained economies that rely on employment
and sustenance from practices that would be displaced, and many
residential areas will be forced to accommodate changes in the use
of their land and water. 6 Even if biofuels prove more efficient in
the long run, the transition itself and the loss of food agricultural
practices could be irreparably destabilizing.
Much attention is directed to synthetic biology because of
recent U.S. Government mandates requiring that 36 billion gallons
of fuel for transport be derived from biofuel, largely ethanol, by
the year 2022." Current ethanol production practices are far from
74 Social justice concerns of resource/labor displacement and unequal access
should not literally be interpreted as "nonphysical." These issues become
physical when they impact the health and well-being of large populations. The
term is used here for the sake of consistency with the terms used in Erik
Parens's Ethical Issues in Synthetic Biology. See PARENS ET AL., supra note 20,
at 4.
7 See Synthetic Solutions to the Climate Crisis: The Dangers of Synthetic
Biology for Biolfuels Production, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, 37 (Sept. 2010),
http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/93/59/9/529/1/SynBio-
Biofuels Report Web.pdf.
76 See id. at 15.
n Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 6,
2013), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewablefuels/index.htm
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sufficient to meet this demand." The primary method begins by
breaking down corn and sugarcane starches into sugars to be
fermented into ethanol, but this process is energy intensive and
requires between a third and a half-gallon of fuel per bushel of
corn.79 Land, energy, and water could all be seriously strained by
the amount of corn that would be required to supplement the 36
billion gallons of biofuel." It is likely that reaching this target
through conventional corn methods would require massive
resource redistribution.
A second approach for ethanol production is to break down
cellulose from discarded plant material, which would greatly
diminish the primary stock problem because of plant-waste
abundance."' However, cellulose is significantly harder to break
down than starch, requiring 50-57% more energy from fossil fuels
78 See U.S. Dep't of Energy Office of Sci., Breaking the Biological Barriers to
Cellulosic Ethanol: A Joint Research Agenda, 13 (June 2006), available at
http://www.genomicscience.energy.gov/biofuels/2005workshop/b2blowres6300
6.pdf ("Traditional cellulosic biorefineries have numerous complex, costly, and
energy-intensive steps that may be incompatible or reduce overall process
efficiency.").
7 Michael Pollan, The Great Yellow Hope, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2006),
http://pollan.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/05/24/the-great-yellow-hope/ ("Every bushel
of corn grown in America has consumed the equivalent of between a third and a
half gallon of gasoline.").
80 See Randy Schnepf & Brent Yacobucci, Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS):
Overview and Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERv. 19, 22-23 (Mar. 14, 2013),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40155.pdf (explaining that corn
produced for biofuel already uses an enormous share of overall corn production
of 40%, and it is uncertain that crop area can continue to expand with demand
because corn is energy intensive).
See generally Amanda Peterka, Fla. plant begins producing ethanol from
waste, GREENWIRE (July 2013), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/
1059985389 (referencing the use of 250,000 raw tons of bio-waste material);
INEOS Bio Produces Cellulosic Ethanol at Commercial Scale,
ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.environmentalleader.
com/20 13/08/02/ineos-bio-achieves-cellulosic-ethanol-production-at-
commercial-scale/ (describing that INEOS has converted several types of waste
including vegetative and yard waste, citrus, oak, pine, and pallet wood waste).
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than the process generates in usable output energy.8 2 One biotech
company has engineered a fungus that can break down cellulose,
but the cost of developing the appropriate processing facility
would be five times greater than building a conventional
corn ethanol processing plant.13 It is likely that no pioneering
manufacturer has adopted this company's technology because it
would not generate swift enough dividends. Thus, an attractive
marketing goal is to engineer a microorganism that can perform the
full gamut of fuel-production on its own. The winning organism
would most likely perform all tasks from breaking down cellulose
and glucose to converting the biomass to usable biofuel. Another
company has begun commercial production of ethanol from
biowaste using a strain of Clostridium,84 and claims it will be able
to produce eight million gallons of ethanol per year. 85 The
company claims high efficiency yield of ethanol and low
environmental impact,86 but data supporting these facts have not
been released.
Even if production methods of companies like the one
described above work as advertised, they could still create a severe
strain on resources such as land, water, and labor. The plant
material for cellulose is generated by perennial feedstocks, which
are bulky and slow to establish." To compensate for the long
growth period and crop size, it is likely that overall land use would
have to increase substantially. Furthermore, their harvest period is
82 See David Pimentel & Tad Patzek, Ethanol Production Using Corn,
Switchgrass, and Wood: Biodiesel Production Using Soybean and Sunflower, 14
NATURAL RESOURCES. RES. 65 (Mar. 2005).
8 This company is called logen, and it is based in Ottawa, Canada. See Jamie
Shreeve, Redesigning Life to Make Ethanol, MIT TECH. REV., 2 (July 1, 2006),
http://www.technologyreview.com/energy/17052/.
84 See Cambridge Website for Synthetic Biology Resources, UNIV. OF
CAMBRIDGE (2013), http://www.synbio.org.uk/index/958-ineos-goes-down-the-
fischer-tropsch-route-to-ethanol-from-municipal-waste.html.
85 See Peterka, supra note 81.
8 See INEOS Bio Produces Cellulosic Ethanol at Commercial Scale, YAHOO
FINANCE (July 31, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ineos-bio-produces-
cellulosic-ethanol-1 35600723.html.
87 Schnepf & Yacobucci, supra note 80, at 24.
328 [VOL. 15: 307
Reproduction-Powered Industry
seasonal, so year-round biofuel production would require immense
transportation and storage resources." This risk of resource-strain
is not just domestic: The 2005 U.S. Energy Act requires the U.S.
Department of State to transfer "climate friendly" technologies to
developing countries. 89 If synthetic biology is among the
transferred technologies, it could increase pressures on scarce
resources and worsen water shortages. If the plant material is
grown directly, this could require large plots of land likely already
in use for other valuable commodities, including marginalized
local sustenance. Some have hinted at potential locations for this
land. At the Asia Pacific Partnership Conference, held in April
2006, Dr. Steven Chu of Berkeley noted that Sub-Saharan Africa
and Latin America in particular have conditions suitable for
biomass production.90
In the end, the fuel produced will likely be distributed
according to the financial terms of the developer. Rural
populations might lose land benefits when their agricultural
practices are replaced by biofuel production for which they will
have far less need. Organizations like the World Trade
Organization, which set international standards for protection of
local economies and prevention of coercive overseas business
transactions, should adopt rules specifically for the
commercialization of synthetic biology. However, because
international law creates minimal regulatory pressure, domestic
law should set a global example through strong legal commitments
to safety and equality. This Article makes suggestions for this kind
of domestic regulation."
8 See id.
89 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1611, 119 Stat. 594
(2005).
90 See DIANA BRONSON, HOPE SHAND, JIM THOMAS & KATHY JO WETTER,
ETC GROUP, EARTH GRAB: GEOPIRACY, THE NEW BIOMASSTERS AND
CAPTURING CLIMATE GENES 70 (Pambazuka Press 2011).
9' See infra Part VI I.
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3. Physical Dangers
The most immediate physical harms pertain to negative
environmental and health impacts from accidental and intentional
release of synthetic biology microorganisms. Bacteria and viruses
are particularly adept at reproduction, mutation, and survival as
they are the oldest, most numerous, diverse, difficult to track, and
deadliest group of organisms on the planet.92 Some of them mutate
into completely new pathogens in a matter of days." Only recently
has scientific understanding of microbial mutation developed so as
to allow researchers to track changes in virulent strains and tailor
treatment and avoidance accordingly.9 4 These methods are not
foolproof-new microbial threats, including the 2009 swine flu,
emerge regularly.95 Furthermore, we cannot permanently treat
infections we have known about for years, like Human
Immunodeficiency Virus." As effective as humans are at adapting,
92 See generally NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES CURRICULUM
STUDY, UNDERSTANDING EMERGING AND RE-EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES (2007), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK20370/
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING INFECTIOUS DISEASES] (discussing the different
mechanisms by which various microorganisms reproduce and mutate); Ed
Rybicki, Where did viruses come from?, SC. AM. (Mar. 27, 2008),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=experts-where-did-viruses-
come-fr (explaining that because of the complex relationship between viruses
and their host genome, "the origins of most viruses may remain forever
obscure."); Matthew Harper, The Most Dangerous Bacteria, FORBES (Mar. 11,
2006, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2006/03/01/antibiotics-pfizer-cubist-
cx mh 0301badbugs.html (highlighting that the problem of "Bug Wars" will
only get worse as more common bacteria and fungi develop resistance to many
of the drugs available).
9 See John W. Drake & John J. Holland, Mutation Rates Among RNA Viruses,
96 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. USA 13910 (1999).
9 See New List OfHIV Mutations Vital To Tracking AIDS Epidemic, SCIENCE
DAILY (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/03/
090305204330.htm.
9 Seasonal influenza reoccurs at least annually. See Seasonal Flu, U.S. Dep't.
of Health & Human Services, http://www.flu.gov/about theflu/hlnl/
index.html, (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) ("WHO announced that the world is in a
post-pandemic period. However, HINL [swine flu] is still circulating.").
96 See New List Of HIV Mutations Vital To Tracking AIDS Epidemic, STAN.
UNIv. MED. CTR. (March 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
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microbes adapt more quickly and take advantage of immune
system deficiencies."7 The concern over the appropriate control
and confinement of microbes is not to be taken lightly.
The environmental release of dangerous synthetic biology
microorganisms could be accidental. Laboratory confinement
mechanisms are not perfect, as evidenced by scientific theories that
both the 1977 Russian flu" and 2009 HINI virus" escaped from
high-end, high-security laboratories. Labs are generating harmful
pathogens including poliovirus, SARS strains, and the Spanish
Flu.'o If inappropriately monitored or contained, these could cause
massive disease infection. Even if regulations prohibit the
production of certain uncommon or eradicated pathogens like those
listed above, some pathogen production will need to be legal for
vaccine development. To treat some reoccurring infections like
seasonal influenza, the infecting agent itself must be created and
maintained.'0 ' Although this development has been ongoing for
decades, synthetic versions of virus seed stock might be generated
in substantially greater quantities as the technology improves. The
synthetic versions may also be less stable or predictable than
conventional versions, thus leading to accidental escape and
contamination. Even laboratories that maintain the highest
containment standards should be subject to continuous review as
technology shifts from traditional rDNA practices to synthetic
biology. Also, as the ease of production increases and the
2009/03/090305204330.htm; Vladimir Trifonov et al., Geographic Dependence,
Surveillance, and Origins of the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) Virus, 361 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 115, 115-19 (2009).
97 See UNDERSTANDING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supra note 92.
98 See Richard Harris, New Strain May Edge Out Seasonal Flu Bugs, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (May 4, 2009, 12:03 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=103711274&sc=emaf.
99 See Simeon Bennet, Scientist Repeats Swine Flu Lab-Escape Claim in
Published Study, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ajw2AS.dlwK8.
100 See Samuel et al., supra note 11, at 10.
1o' See How Vaccines are Made, History of Vaccines, THE COLLEGE OF
PHYSICIANS OF PHILADELPHIA (2013), http://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/
how-vaccines-are-made.
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technology continues to be publicly available, insufficiently trained
participants are performing microbial experiments in facilities not
subject to laboratory guidelines.'0 2 Accidental release from these
"amateur" facilities would be even more likely. Beneficent but
careless production is the most likely cause of accidental release.
Some precautionary mechanisms that can be implemented
include incorporation of toggle switches to disarm or kill the
engineered microbes and engineering cells to demonstrate highly
predictable behavior.o3 But the possibility for mutation has never
been and probably cannot be eliminated, as researchers know very
little about what causes mutation and how to prevent it. 104
Additionally, gene-environment interaction is important to
microorganism behavior but is poorly understood.' 5 Removing
parts of an organism's genome in the hopes of simplifying it might
make the organism unviable or unpredictable.0 6 Thus, it is likely
that no method of "bioconfinement" will be completely effective.0o
Accordingly, a regulatory framework will need to set strict
standards for monitoring and containment. Recommendations to
this end are proposed in Part VII of this Article.
Even if synthetic organisms remain properly contained during
development, major concerns remain when the "successfully
designed" cells are intentionally released. Extraordinary
102 See discussion of do-it-yourself synthetic biology supra Part III.A.
103 See Drew Endy, Foundations for Engineering Biology, 438 NATURE 449,
450, 452 (2005); Ahmad Khalil & James Collins, Synthetic Biology:
Applications Come ofAge, 11 NAT. REV. GENETICS 367, 367 (2010).
104 See James F. Crow, How Much Do We Know About Spontaneous Human
Mutation Rates?, 21 ENVTL. & MOLECULAR MUTAGENESIS 122, 122-29 (1993).
'os See generally Jan-Willem Veening, Wiep Klaas Smits & Oscar P. Kuipers,
Bistability, Epigenetics, and Bet-Hedging in Bacteria, 62 ANN. REV.
MICROBIOLOGY 193 (2008) (explaining that there are multiple and complex
ways in which epigenetics plays an essential role in the phenotypic variability of
microorganisms).
106 See Caruso, supra note 1, at 5-6.
107 News Release, Nat'l Research Council, Committee on Biological
Confinement of Genetically Engineered Organisms, Biological Confinement of
Genetically Engineered Organisms, (Jan. 20, 2004), http://www.nap.edu/
webcast/webcast detail.php?webcast id=260.
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uncertainty arises with the possibility of horizontal gene transfer
between synthesized organisms and naturally occurring
organisms.'" Consideration must also be given to the effects of
disturbing the balance produced by organisms that have been
responding to each other's evolutionary changes over hundreds of
thousands of years.'O9 Predicting outcomes becomes futile because
the permutations of interaction between the synthesized organism
and those naturally occurring are virtually infinite. Companies that
hope to grow their "living factories" in the environment, or use
cells as cleaning agents or pesticides, should be required to adhere
to the strictest standards of tracking and control. If commercial
organisms cannot be proven safe through guaranteed incorporated
limitations on ability to mutate through horizontal and vertical
gene transfer reproduction, they should be banned from production.
The effects of allowing otherwise could be devastating.
V. ARGUMENTS DISMISSING THE DANGERS OF SYNTHETIC
BIOLOGY
Three salient arguments that dismiss the dangers of synthetic
biology deserve to be characterized and countered. These can be
summarized as follows: (1) regulations are already in place for
rDNA practices and synthetic biology is not distinct enough to
require new oversight; "o (2) researchers will self-regulate to
prevent major risks; "' and (3) regulation cannot prevent the
creation of dangerous synthetic organisms, so it would serve no
purpose. The latter argument is based on the general assertion that
something difficult to prevent is not worth trying to prevent.
108 See Drake & Holland, supra note 93, at 13910-12.
109 Maggie Zhou, Commentary, Comments on Synthetic Biology
(Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.climatesos.org/2010/11/comments-to-presidential-
commission-on-synthetic-biology/ (addressing the Presidential Commission for
the Study of Bioethical Issues).
1io See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 27.
11 See AMY GUTMANN & JAMES WAGNER, NEW DIRECTIONS: THE ETHICS OF
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, at v (2010),
available at http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/PCSBI-Synthetic-Biology-
Report-12.16.10 0.pdf [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS].
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Responses to the first two points were addressed indirectly in
previous sections," 2 but deserve more detail in light of historical
harm caused by rDNA practices. The third point relies on the false
premise that the possibility of harm is equivalent to the
inevitability of harm, which overlooks the power of education and
choice.
A belief that current rDNA regulations are sufficient to address
synthetic biology risks assumes that: (1) current rDNA regulations
are sufficient even for current rDNA practices and (2) compared to
intergeneric organisms, which are products of rDNA technology,
the uncertainty of whole genome synthesis does not lead to greater
risk of pathogenic mutation or less controllability. Regarding the
claim that rDNA regulations are sufficient, there are scientists and
physicians who would disagree based on studies of genetically
modified products. Several animal studies on consumption of
genetically modified food show serious deleterious effects,
including birth deformities and mortality,"' liver atrophy," 4 and
toxic effects on the pancreas, stomach, and blood systems. "
Whether these effects translate to humans has yet to be adequately
studied."' There are also several case studies of human and animal
allergies and illnesses closely linked to transgenic crops '"
Theories that the HINI flu virus of 2009 was made in the lab and
I12 See supra Part I (discussing the previous untested novelty of synthetic
biology, the lack of existing oversight for research and development, and the
corporate pressures on research to produce results that compromise researchers'
ability to self-regulate).
113 See Mae-Wan Ho, Joe Cummins, & Peter Saunders, GM Food Nightmare
Unfolding in the Regulatory Sham, 19 MICROBIAL ECOLOGY IN HEALTH AND
DISEASE 66, 66 (2007).
114 See Arpad Pusztai, Can Science Give Us the Tools for Recognizing
Possible Health Risks of GM Food?, 16 NUTRITION & HEALTH 73, 81 (2002).
" See Artemis Dona & loannis Arvanitoyannis, Health Risks of Genetically
Modified Foods, 49 CRITICAL REVIEWS IN FOOD SCI. AND NUTRITION 164, 169-
70 (2009).
116 See id at 164.
117 See Ho, Cummins & Saunders, supra note 113, at 67 (describing allergies
from exposure to Bt cotton, thousands of sheep deaths from grazing on Bt cotton
residue, human illnesses from a protein in Bt maize, and several similar
linkages).
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escaped garnered significant scientific support. "' Several live
rDNA viruses produced for vaccines can revert to full virulence at
random and scientists have yet to determine the cause."' These
examples support the notion that current rDNA regulations may
not be adequate to prevent substantial harm from current rDNA
practices, let alone synthetic biology practices.
Even if protections against intergeneric organisms are
sufficient, the additional uncertainty of synthetic biology weighs in
favor of modified regulation. The relationship between uncertainty
and risk should be demonstrated, but there is disagreement as to
whether technology stakeholders or the public should provide such
a demonstration. For example, those with a stake in the
technology, such as researchers and investors, believe the burden
falls on the wary party, usually civil society, to prove that the
technology is not safe. Those concerned about harm believe the
burden rests with the developers to prove it is safe. However, the
only method for evaluating danger associated with the new
practice, and thus with whom the burden should lie, is through
comparison to past experiences.
While intergeneric organisms are the closest parallel, synthetic
organisms do not benefit from environmentally tested stability.120
1 Richard Seah, HiNi: Is it a manmade genetically engineered virus?, FLU
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT-NATURALLY (2010), http://www.flu-
treatments.com/h1nl-virus.html.
"9 Terje Traavik, An Orphan in Science: Environmental Risks of Genetically
Engineered Vaccines, REPORT TO THE DIRECTORATE FOR NATURE
MANAGEMENT, NORWAY, 21, 27, 49 (1999), available at http://www.biosafety-
info.net/article.php?aid=515. Currently, live vaccination practices are used for
measles, mumps, and rubella, which were determined safe by trial and error.
But this form of administration was discovered harmful for treating poliovirus.
It is likely that several "vaccinated" people died of poliovirus while this
determination was made. Id.
120 Fully synthetic organisms that are not just copies of existing organisms,
such as Venter's Synthia, will not be the norm for quite a while. Current
synthetic biology generally involves the insertion of some lab-synthesized genes
into a pre-existing microbe. This is similar to rDNA practices, but lab-synthesis
makes genes more available and will eventually make it easier to produce novel
genes.
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E. coli is an exemplar of intergeneric stability; researchers can use
several strains of it for gene splicing because these organisms are
hardy and less prone to pathogenic mutation. 21 However, as
previously explained, mutation is not well understood and its
complete prevention is currently impossible. 122 The mutation
patterns of synthetic organisms will be more unfamiliar than those
naturally occurring, which have been observed for several
decades.' 2 3 Furthermore, genetic stability cannot be built into a
synthetic organism if the builder doesn't know what accounts for
stability in the first place. Because of past harms demonstrated by
rDNA organisms, natural pathogens, and the gravity of potential
harm from unstable synthetic microbes, regulation should require
those pursuing the research to prove that it is safe.
In conjunction with the reasons just stated, industry
self-regulation will be insufficient to protect against synthetic
biology harms. This is because it is not reasonable to hold
researchers and investors solely responsible for preempting the
field's dangers when their goals center on advancement of the field.
Scientists invest their lives and livelihoods into this work under
great pressure from industry and media, so it is foreseeable- that
they would prioritize the realization of synthetic biology promises
over safety considerations.
An early example of failed self-regulation is the Asilomar
Declaration of 1975, in which public rDNA fears facilitated the
convention of several handpicked, elite scientists to discuss
potential safety issues.'24 Civil society was unrepresented at the
121 See General Information: Escherichia coli, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/general/index.html (last visited Aug. 12,
2013); National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases, CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/ (last visited
Aug. 12, 2013).
122 See Veening et al., supra note 105.
123 Comprehension of mutation patterns is largely the product of empirical
evidence, which does not exist for novel synthetic organisms. See generally J. L.
Martinez & F. Baquero, Mutation Frequencies and Antibiotic Resistance, 44
ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 1771 (2000) (describing the
mutation rates of pathogens as related to the use of antibiotics over time).
124 See THOMAS, supra note 2, at 46.
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Asilomar meetings, and the discussion resulted in few temporarily
relinquished experiments to assuage public concern while it
completely overlooked broader social and ethical concerns. 125
Obviously, this Declaration set little preventative precedent with
shortsighted genetic engineering endeavors like Monsanto's
"Golden Rice" occurring twenty-five years later. 126 Currently,
self-regulation attempts in synthetic biology are limited to a few
obligatory quotes from scientists acknowledging there might be
some risks, and few gene manufacturers self-screening for
dangerous orders.127
Finally, it is not persuasive to argue that regulation serves no
purpose because it cannot prevent the creation of dangerous
organisms. The first inherent fallacy in this belief is that regulation
would be ineffective. If this paper's recommendations in Part VII
are followed, constraint of public information can be implemented
swiftly and the ability to create pathogenic microbes can be
isolated to research settings. If these settings are required to
adhere to strict containment measures, the organisms created will
have no access to the environment, thus neutralizing their
dangerous attributes. Regulation can also prohibit the creation of
particularly virulent and robust strains that are found to be too
dangerous even for research. This kind of prohibition is
demonstrated by the United Nations' 2005 Ban on Cloning, which
determined that cloning was incompatible with human dignity and
125 id,
126 In 2000, Monsanto widely advertised its distribution of vitamin A enriched
GE rice to the third world to compensate for malnutrition. The product could
not provide adequate nutritional value to compensate for the deficiency, but the
recipients relied on it heavily, forgoing other sources of Vitamin A. It is
speculated that this overreliance aggravated health problems. See Vandana
Shiva, The Golden Rice Hoax-When Public Relations Replaces Science,
GENETIC ENGINEERING AND ITS DANGERS, http://online.sfsu.edu/-rone/
GEessays/goldenricehoax.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2013); Paul Brown, GE
"Golden Rice" Propaganda Denounced as a Hoax, ORGANIC CONSUMERS
ASS'N (Feb. 10, 2001), http://www.organicconsumers.org/corp/gericetoofar.cfm.
127 See Samuel et al., supra note 11, at 13.
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the protection of human life.'28 A similar ban on human-animal
hybrids exists in several states domestically. 129 As of this
publication, there are no known examples of either prohibited
practice.
This leads to the second inherent fallacy that regulation is
useless even if the practice is difficult to prevent. Regulation
creates several modes of deterrence beyond sanctions for
noncompliance, including the representation of national sentiment.
Particularly in a democratic government, positions taken by
executive agencies and the legislature should reflect and reinforce
the opinions of the majority. Combining the principle behind the
regulation with educational support from nonprofits, schools, and
media might be an effective method of informing public choice on
how to engage with new technology. In this way, citizens,
scientists, and amateurs can choose to abstain from dangerous
experiments. This precautionary approach of ensuring safety is
superior to waiting for human lives to be negatively impacted
before reactionary regulation is catalyzed.
VI. CURRENT REGULATION
The dangers previously discussed demonstrate that the
development of synthetic biology cannot be left solely to market
forces and scientific discretion. Regulations will have to protect
against intentional malicious design of pathogens, address the
potential for expansion of socioeconomic disparities, solidify
safety and confinement measures, and preempt negative
environmental impact from released modified organisms. Neither
the United States nor international governments, however, have to
start from scratch. Biotechnology regulations have developed
around several genetic engineering products and are at least in part
128 See Press Release, General Assembly Adopts United Nations Declaration
on Human Cloning by Vote of 84-34-37, General Assembly/10333, Fifty-Ninth
General Assembly Plenary, 82nd Meeting (Aug. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gal0333.doc.htm.
129 Eric Bland, Animal Human Hybrids Banned in Some States, DISCOVERY
NEWS (June 4, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://news.discovery.com/tech/human-animal-
hybrids-splice.html.
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responsible for respectable biosafety records in the United States
and abroad.' 30
This section will begin by critiquing shortcomings of the
Presidential Commission's Report on synthetic biology; second, it
will examine international regulations that should apply to the
development of the field; third, it will analyze applicable rules and
operations of U.S. agencies; and it will conclude with suggestions
for modification to agency rules and operations that would create
comprehensive oversight.
A. The Presidential Commission's Report
Hopes for meaningful regulation of synthetic biology were
briefly peaked in 2010 when, in response to the JCVI
announcement regarding the creation of Synthia, President Obama
asked his Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues to
examine the field's risks."' When the Presidential Commission's
Report ("Report") was released, those hopes were quashed. The
Report provides impressive detail on the development, potential
advantages, and risks of synthetic biology, but provides no specific
recommendations for oversight.13 2
The Presidential Commission, an advisory body composed of
well-respected professionals from medicine, science, law, ethics,
and engineering, "' examined synthetic biology as its first
130 See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 13.
'1' Jeffrey Mervis, Obama Orders Review of Synthetic Biology, SCIENCE
INSIDER (May 20, 2010, 6:57 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/2010/05/obama-
orders-review-synthetic-biology.
132 See generally NEW DIRECTIONS supra note 111, at v (describing five
categories of ethical considerations related to synthetic biology, but eschewing
the recommendation of practical mechanisms to address the field's potential
dangers).
'3 See Presidential Commission for the Study ofBioethical Issues, History of
the Bioethics Commission, BIOETHICS, available at http:// bioethics.gov/history.
The Commission's chartered objectives include "advis[ing] the President on
bioethical issues that may emerge as a consequence of advances in biomedicine
and related areas of science and technology." Id. Versions of the Commission
existed under previous administrations going back forty years and they have
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undertaking. The Commission held hearings in which
representatives from research and engineering, including Endy and
Venter, touted promises of renewable energy, treatments, and
vaccines. 134 University faculty, members of environmental
protection groups, government agencies, and scholarly think tanks
discussed benefits, risks, ethics, and oversight.'13  After two days of
probing questions and informative panels, the Commission also
solicited public comments to further guide their
recommendations.13 6
The 175 page Report was published six months after the
President's request and provides little guidance on effective
regulation of synthetic biology. This is because the Commission
merely found that "synthetic biology is capable of significant but
limited achievements posing limited risks. Future developments
may raise further objections, but the Commission found no reason
to endorse additional federal regulations or a moratorium on work
in this field at this time."'3
The Report's recommendations support open-access
development'3 and public funding for synthetic biology projects
that promote the "public good."'" The Report also encourages the
federal government to periodically review the field, ensure
consistent regulatory requirements, and update the public on
findings.'4 0 However, at no point does the Report make specific
suggestions for how the risks of synthetic biology should be
advised the President on issues including human subject research, life-sustaining
treatment, defining death, and stem cell research. Id.
134 See Webcast, Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues,
Meeting One: July 8-9, 2010 in Washington D.C., BIOETHICS,
http://www.tvworldwide.com/events/bioethics/100708/ (last visited Oct. 1,
2013).
"' See id
136 Interested parties were able to submit feedback to the Commission via its
website at bioethics.gov until September 1, 2010. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra
note I11, at 22.
'3 See id. at v.
138 Id. at 7.
139 Id. at 6-7.
140 Id. at 8.
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managed. This was clearly an intentional disregard as opposed to
ignorance because the "Risks" section of the Report describes in
detail many of the dangers covered in this Article's analysis.141
The Commission considered and reported on the concerns
voiced by members of civil society who spoke at the hearings, as
well as those written in public comments by several
organizations.142 However, the final recommendations show little
appreciation for their gravity, and instead issue vague warnings
that caution might be warranted in the future.143 Even though the
Commission might have been genuine in its belief that
self-regulation adequately protects against present synthetic
biology dangers, there is a disconnect between this belief and the
Report's findings. It acknowledges the uncertain nature of harm
from accidental release, and that not all research-implemented
containment strategies will necessarily be adequate. 144 It further
acknowledges the potential for land mass destruction and
displacement of resources on which already-marginalized
communities subsist. " It also tries to dismiss the threat of
"bioterror" by saying the tools to grow pathogens are only in the
hands of few people due to financial and technical requirements,' 6
which is questionable in light of examples like the iGEM
competition.
Even though the Commission might believe that actionable
concern is unwarranted, many others remain unconvinced. In
response to the Report's publication, fifty-eight environmental,
public interest, and religious groups issued a joint letter to the
Commission criticizing the Report for "ignoring the precautionary
principle, lacking adequate review of environmental risks, [and]
placing unwarranted faith in ... technologies that provide no
141 See id. at 62-67.
142 See id at 22 (explaining that the Commission listened to expert concerns
and solicited public comments), 62-63, 67 (enumerating the risks of accidental
release, intentional release, land mass conversion, and human application).
1" See id. at 170-71.
144 Id. at 63.
145 id
146 Id. at 72.
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guarantee against the escape of synthetic organisms."1 4 7 Advocates
and opponents would likely agree that the Report's implicit
message is that safety and environmental concerns pale in
comparison to the promises of reproduction-powered industry.
This evaluation is particularly hard to accept in light of the fact that
safety has not been demonstrated over multiple generations of
synthetic biology-based production, and potential harms include
pandemic infection of food, land, livestock, and humans.
B. International Regulation
Recent international efforts to regulate synthetic biology have
begun to address unique safety and health risks, but these efforts
are not sufficient to preempt dangers caused by unpredictable
novel organisms. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
("BWC") was designed to prevent the creation and storage of
biological weapons. 148 The Convention on Biological Diversity
includes efforts to ensure regulation of international movement of
Living Modified Organisms, including the requirement that
member parties provide informed consent prior to receipt or
delivery. 149 The United States is a party to the former
Convention,"o but has shirked its specified regulatory requirements.
147 Groups Criticize Presidential Commission's Recommendations on
Synthetic Biology, ETC. GROUP (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.etcgroup.org/
content/groups-criticize-presidential-commission%E2%80%99s-
recommendations-synthetic-biology.
148 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, THE BIOLOGICAL AND ToxINs WEAPONS CONVENTION (Apr. 10,
1972), http://www.opbw.org/convention/documents/btwctext.pdf [hereinafter
BWC].
149 About the Protocol, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/background/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2013) [hereinafter
CBD].
1o About the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, THE BIOLOGICAL
AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION, http://www.opbw.org/ (last visited Aug. 8,
2013).
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The United States is not a party to the latter Convention."' These
instances of nonparticipation set a poor regulatory example for
synthetic biology both domestically and internationally.
The intentional malicious release of synthetic microorganisms
is regulated by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
("BWC"),152 but the effort is more likely symbolic than effective.
This international treaty bans the development, production,
stockpiling, and transfer of "[m]icrobial or other biological agents,
or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types
and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes.""' As such, the BWC and
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention prohibit the intentional
development and production of toxin-producing organisms through
the use of synthetic biology.'54
Unfortunately, the ability to monitor and regulate against this
kind of proliferation is seriously limited. Access to genetic
information, gene fragments, and tools for production is not
well-guarded; recall that college students have access to synthetic
biology synthesis tools,"' and any individual intending to design
pathogens could order genes from multiple manufacturers, thereby
circumventing suspect combination ordering that might otherwise
be detected when ordering from a single gene manufacturer."'
Even though the United States is a signatory to the BWC, and
thus subject to the Article IV requirement of taking national
measures to prevent the misuse and means of delivery of biological
agents,"' it has been lax in its duty. Certainly the publication of
151 Parties to the Protocol and signature and ratification of the Supplementary
Protocol, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/
parties/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).
152 THOMAS, supra note 2, at 48.
'53 BWC, supra note 148 at art. 1(1).
154 THOMAS, supra note 2, at 48.
1 See iGEM, supra note 26.
156 See Aldhous, supra note 67.
15About the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, THE BIOLOGICAL
AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION, http://www.opbw.org/ (last visited Aug. 8,
2013).
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virulent pathogen genomes and do-it-yourself synthetic biology
culture together enable such misuse, yet participating journals and
authors have only received public reprimands from peers, at most.
The open-access mentality that pervades the field of synthetic
biology and lack of regulatory infrastructure regarding gene
fragment distribution further promote the potential misuse and
delivery of malicious agents.
International regulatory efforts to address commercial use and
environmental release of Living Modified Organisms ("LMO")-a
category that includes synthetic biology organisms-were
established by the Convention on Biological Diversity, which was
formed by United Nations parties interested in sustainable
development.'" In 2003, the Convention developed the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, which is an international treaty governing
the movements of LMOs from one country to another.159 The
Cartagena Protocol provides mechanisms for developing countries
to receive valuable information before agreeing to the import of
LMOs.'o The mechanisms include an Advance Informed Agreement
to ensure that importing countries understand the risks inherent in
LMO receipt 161 and make information available about LMOs
through a bio-safety clearing house. 16 2 The Cartagena Protocol has
166 signatories, but the United States is not among them.16' The
U.S. Department of State explained that it was concerned instead
about unnecessarily strict barriers to trade, referencing the
158 History of the Convention, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
http://www.cbd.int/history/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).
0 CBD, supra note 149.
160 Id
161 See Advance Informed Agreement Procedure, PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY
TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Jan. 29, 2000),
http://bch.cbd.int/ protocol/NKL text.shtml.
162 Id. at art. 20.
163 The U.S. is not a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity, so it is
not eligible for party status to the Cartagena Protocol. See Parties to the
Protocol and Signature and Ratification of the Supplementary Protocol, supra
note 151.
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importance of food aid delivery during times of crisis.'" Other
parties, including those whose previous agreement efforts have
been complicated by the United States, frame the United States'
abstention as a subordination of environmental concerns in favor
of free trade."'
Nonparticipation of the United States notwithstanding, the
Protocol's efficacy in protecting against synthetic biology hazards
is questionable due to broad room for interpretation. The
Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Protocol for Redress and Liability of
LMOs-a supplementary agreement to the Cartagena Protocol-
creates loose standards for accountability in the event of damage
caused to the environment by LMOs.'66 This document employs
three protective themes for parties to the Convention:
(1) compensation; (2) capacity building; and (3) creation of domestic
law.' Each theme delegates responsibilities. Entities (such as
businesses exporting LMOs) that cause LMO harm must
compensate the harmed nation; parties to the convention who host
LMO producers must create domestic law to regulate LMO exports
and implement monitoring schemes for LMO production; and
parties to the Protocol with sufficient resources must assist
less-developed parties with developing their own LMO regulatory
frameworks. 6 8 Furthermore, Article 12 states that "[p]arties shall
implement domestic law for rules and procedures that address
responsibility for damages."I69
64 Frequently Asked Questions on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE (Feb. 23, 2004), http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/rls/
or/2004/2975 1.htm.
i6s Lavanya Rajamani, The Cartagena Protocol-A Battle Over Trade or
Biosafety?, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/lavanya-
cn.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2013).
166 See generally Liability and Redress for Damage Resulting from GMOs,
THIRD WORLD NETWORK (2012), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/books/
pdf/liabilityand redress.pdf.
167 See generally Text of the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol
on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Oct. 15 2010),
bch.cbd.int/protocol/NKL text.shtml [hereinafter NKLSP].
6 Id. at art. 5.
69 See id. at art. 12 ("Implementation and Relation to Civil Liability. ").
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These measures appear protective at face value, but the
Supplementary Protocol also simplifies circumvention. Causation
must be shown between the microorganism and the harm caused in
order for repercussions to take effect, '70 yet standards are not
explicit for demonstrating causation. Furthermore, several
exemptions to responsibility for causing harm are enumerated,
including acts of God, war, or any other exemption a party deems
fit through its own domestic laws."' Specific standards to keep
countries accountable for harm caused by their distribution of
LMOs are nonexistent. In order for the Protocol to have real
deterrent value in the prevention of microbial mishaps, each article
should provide more specific standards.
Unfortunately, the Conventions here described have not
prevented or even slowed the creation of synthetic organisms that
could lead to intentional misuse or commercial release. Their
existence demonstrates global concern for harm that can stem from
biological products, but the intensified dangers of synthetic
biology go unrecognized, especially in the United States. The
potential for self-replicating fuel, food, and other consumer
products is blinding investors and nations to the potential for
self-replicating pathogens and unjustifiable land conversion. The
coordinated domestic regulatory framework proposed at the end of
this Article should be implemented in conjunction with ratification
of the Cartagena Protocol, and implementation of intentional
release control measures as required by the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention.
C. United States Agency Regulations
Currently, the United States model for biotech regulation is
product-oriented, in which the appropriate agencies are responsible
for overseeing the risks posed by the products of genetic
engineering currently under their purview.'7 2 The precedent for
this was the "Coordinated Framework," which came out of the
170 See id. at art. 4 ("Causation").
171 See id. at art. 6 ("Exemptions").
172 See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 31.
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White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy in
1986.173 This policy statement declared that organisms created
with rDNA did not pose any unique risks in comparison to those
conventionally created. 174 As such, genetically engineered
products should be regulated instead of processes, and
contemporary laws were deemed sufficient to address the risks."'
The result has been an uncoordinated patchwork of coverage,
which some critics claim over-regulates biotechnology, while
others claim it under-regulates biotechnology.'76 An examination
of some of the most relevant agency biotechnology acts and rules
demonstrates that adjustments toward regulation of process,
control of particularly dangerous information, and compliance
incentive structures through inter-agency coordination can
reasonably secure against the potential harms of synthetic biology.
NIH and rDNA Guidelines: The NIH has developed research
standards that have been recently and specifically modified to
consider synthetic biology."' Although useful, they are limited in
coverage. In 1975, NIH established the Recombinant Advisory
Committee ("RAC") as a body to "provide independent federal
scientific oversight of proposed rDNA research and to establish
standardized safety guidelines for researchers.""'7  Recombinant
DNA technology was new, and genetics was poorly understood, so
the guidelines initially issued were conservative as compared to
today's guidelines. As the technology proved valuable and
reasonably safe over time, the RAC delegated oversight authority
1 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23, 302 (June 26, 1986).
174 See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 35-36.
1' See 51 Fed. Reg. at 23, 302.
176 See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 13.
17 The amendments include modification of the definition of "rDNA"
molecule. Synthetic nucleic acids that can be created without joining segments
are added to those created by standard joining techniques and those replicated by
joining techniques. See Office of Biotechnology Activities, NIH Guidelines for
Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules, NAT'L
INST. OF HEALTH, § 1-B, available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/rdna/nih
guidelines oba.html.
17 See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 20.
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to local Institutional Biosafety Committees ("IBCs"), the
establishment of which is one requirement for the receipt of NIH
funding for rDNA experimentation.179 Factors including pathogenicity,
virulence, communicability, and environmental stability determine
the level of IBC notification.'s The highest risk requiring direct
approval from the NIH and the degree of containment required, is
laid out by "Biosafety Levels" in the research guidelines."' Under
the recent amendments, these levels appear to reflect the dangers
of synthesizing virulent pathogenic agents proportionately. The
guidelines address the concern that predictive power regarding
virulence, communicability, or the other criteria becomes weaker
when the organism's genes come from multiple sources.'82 The
recommendation is that the "synergistic effect" of multiple risk
groups be given serious consideration when determining the
appropriate biosafety levels.'83
The NIH's guidelines are comprehensive and reasonably
well-tailored to safe confinement of synthetic biology research.
However, the guidelines do not address the intentional release of
organisms for commercial purposes, nor does the NIH wield any
control over organizations not receiving its funding.'84 The White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy recognized the
need to examine intentionally released organisms, and, thus,
generated the Coordinated Framework. With regard to the
179 See id. at 30. IBCs function much like Institutional Review Boards,
consisting of four to five members representing appropriate expertise for the
field being reviewed. The individuals on the committee must be registered with
NIH's office of biotechnology, keep minutes, and open meetings to the public
when reasonable. Problems or violations must be reported to the Office of
Biotechnology activities within 30 days. Id.
180 See id.
.81 See id. at 34 (citing § II-A-3).
182 See Office of Biotechnology Activities, Notice Pertinent to the March
2013 Revisions of the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, 13-15 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/rdna/nih guidelinesnew.htm.I8 See id. at 13.
184 The NIH has no enforcement body, so its only enforcement mechanism is
withdrawing funding.
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confinement standards, the NIH's enforcement mechanisms
against noncompliance are to refuse or withdraw funding and/or
report research events that may be related to public health to state
and local health departments.' These tools create reasonable
deterrence, but they cannot prevent researchers from performing
privately funded experiments under whatever degree of
confinement they choose.
The EPA and the Toxic Substances Control Act: The amended
Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") includes some language
providing a significant line of defense against genetically modified
organisms, but needs further modification to cover synthetic
biology.'" The TSCA was passed by Congress in 1976 for the
EPA to use in response to discontent with the health and
environmental impact of chemicals like dioxin and asbestos. ""
The language of the Act allows the EPA to test existing chemicals
and control those posing unreasonable risk, and to screen and track
new chemicals before they enter the market.'" Manufacturers are
also required to notify the EPA of new chemicals not in their
inventory within 90 days.' In 1997, the EPA finalized rules that
brought genetically engineered organisms under the umbrella of
the "new chemicals" regulation of TSCA by deciding that
non-natural arrangements of nucleic acids be included in this
category.'9 0 The rules require a special application for environmental
release tests called a TSCA Experimental Release Application
("TERA").' They also have a notice requirement, or a Microbial
Commercial Activity Notification ("MCAN"), that must be
submitted 90 days before organisms are produced for a commercial
purpose.'92
185 See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 25.
186 See id. at 35.
8 See id.
8 See id
9 See id
190 See Reporting Requirements and Review Processes for Microorganisms,
40 C.F.R. § 725 (1997).
'9' See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 35.
192 See 40 C.F.R. § 725.1.
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Although these are beneficial protections for conventionally
engineered organisms, the EPA's rule modifications define
"intergeneric microorganism" in a way that may preclude synthetic
biology from the Act's regulatory scope. "Intergeneric microorganism
means a microorganism that is formed by the deliberate
combination of genetic material originally isolated from organisms
of different taxonomic genera."9 3 On its face, this does not appear
to cover organisms containing lab-synthesized DNA unless they
also have gene donors from different taxonomic genera. Although
the TSCA's original definition of "new chemical substances" may
be broad enough to cover synthetic biology, the newer intergeneric
organism rules may have unintentionally exempted synthetic
organisms from regulation.
In addition, the TSCA's "new chemicals" regulation only
covers substances designed for commercial purposes, 1' which
would not cover noncommercial laboratory research. In fact, a
section specifically exempts from regulation small amounts of
chemicals produced for experimentation, analysis, and research for
product development."' This language formulation clarifies that
genetically engineered organisms were not considered in the
development of the original Act. The drafter's assumption was
likely that a limited amount of an inanimate chemical would have
limited health and safety impact. Unlike inanimate chemicals,
even a limited number of organisms may have extraordinarily
broad health and safety implications. The newer intergeneric rules
specifically cover laboratory research and development by
acknowledging the danger posed by small amounts of organisms,'96
but as previously discussed, many cells containing synthesized
DNA and not transgenic DNA would be outside this defined scope.
The EPA also needs to determine methods to sufficiently
monitor the activity of companies over which it is supposed to
have authority. This is because, currently, the overstretched
193 See 40 C.F.R. § 725.3.
194 See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 36.
195 See 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2013).
196 See 40 C.F.R. § 725.205 (1997).
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agency relies on manufacturers to provide data in order to perform
its risk analysis of new chemicals' toxicities. "' If the company
does not have enough information to perform a "reasoned
evaluation" of health and safety risks, the company is only
required to delay manufacture if it can show that the chemical
presents an "unreasonable risk." 198 As Michael Rodemeyer
explains, it is unlikely that the EPA can determine an unreasonable
safety risk without enough information to perform a reasoned
evaluation beforehand. This catch-22 limits the EPA's
intervention, which has been demonstrated by the meager total of
16 MCANs submitted to the EPA in the past 10 years.'99
The FDA and the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act: The role of
the FDA's regulation of biotechnology concerns a broad range of
products and will translate to synthetic organisms with little
difficulty. This is because the agency has broad authority to
regulate drugs, cosmetics, food, food additives, animal feed,
biologics, and medical devices under provisions of the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").20 0 The FDCA requires that drugs
and medical devices be proven safe and effective by the developer
before they can be marketed.20 ' Once the drug or device moves
into the manufacturing stage, the agency still has authority to
ensure that current good manufacturing practices are used to
prevent drug adulteration.20 2 The manufacturer is also required to
report to FDA for approval if it changes its manufacturing
practices.203 Thus, if a company trades conventional production for
synthetic biology, the FDA will have to certify the switch. At this
point, the agency has the authority to impose biosafety standards
and measures for worker safety.204 There is reason to believe they
will do so. This is because in the early 1980s, the FDA explicitly
197 See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 37.
198 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e)(1)(A) (2013).
199 See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 40.
200 See 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2013).
201 See id.
202 See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 41.
203 See 21 U.S.C. § 356a (2013).
204 See RODEMEYER, supra note 13, at 41.
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recommended that drug and biologic manufacturers using rDNA
technology should follow the NIH guidelines regarding biosafety
measures. 20 5
Although the FDA has no direct authority to require
compliance with NIH guidelines for rDNA, it may have the
greatest regulatory authority for the present concerns. When
synthetic biology plays a commercial role in the development and
production of drugs, vaccines, other biologics, or medical devices,
the FDA has the power to instigate and enforce the appropriate
precautionary measures. If manufacturers do not comply, their
products will not be certified for market and if they still attempt to
commercialize they can be fined and shut down. 206 The fact that
the burden of proof for drug and biologic safety is on the developer
is a great boon to the prevention of synthetic biology harms. The
direct application of food and drugs to the human body requires the
most stringent standards for health and safety; thus, the FDA acts
as a filter that products must pass through to get from manufacture
to consumption.
VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR MODIFICATION
Together, the agencies discussed above have complimentary
oversight capacity to ensure the safe and effective development of
synthetic biology. However, their specific rules and operations
need minor modifications to reach this goal. Subpart A will
describe how the NIH must employ its powerful funding incentives
to restrict financial assistance to well-planned and non-malicious
synthetic biology research. Subpart B will describe methods for
the EPA to improve auditing of commercial synthetic biology and
encourage companies to comply with EPA safety standards.
Subpart C will delineate FDA rule modifications that would
require explicit plans for containment and control of all synthetic
biology development. If followed, this set of modifications would
205 See Edward Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for rDNA Research and the
authority of the FDA to require compliance with the guidelines, 21 JURIMETRICS
J. 264, 266 (1981).
206 See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
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adequately fill U.S. regulatory gaps and should assuage concerns
regarding the risks posed by synthetic biology development.
A. NIH Modification
The NIH's guidelines are not sufficient for addressing all
synthetic biology concerns. However, creative options could be
employed for effective use of the agency's enforcement tools for
bioconfinement. Gene manufacturers and organism retailers could
be given the option to register with NIH, and the agency could
offer an incentive such as a label of "NIH Certification" to be more
attractive to consumers. A corresponding licensing procedure
could be implemented that made orders for particularly dangerous
organisms, gene fragments, and gene combinations available only
to institutions funded by the NIH and approved for particular
experiments. The NIH could then refuse to fund genetic research
that uses gene products purchased from unregistered manufacturers.
Additionally, to address private research the NIH could issue
strong recommendations that the biobrick registry and other public
databases of genetic information should transition to limited access
with sliding scale licensing. The general public would then have
access to a basic set of gene codes and researchers could be
required to have a security clearance or license to access gene
information with increasing danger and complexity.
B. EPA and TSCA Modification
Simple language addition to the "intergeneric microorganisms"
definition in the 1997 rules could cover the gap through which
synthetic cells have slipped. Language like "Microorganisms that
are formed in whole or in part by laboratory synthesized DNA"
would be sufficient to require the tracking and screening of
synthetic microbial "chemicals" in laboratory research and
development, and in commercial production.
The EPA exempts research that is required to comply with the
NIH guidelines or that operates under functionally equivalent
biosafety conditions, 207 which provokes two concerns for lab
207 See 40 C.F.R. § 725.232 (2011).
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confinement regulations. The first was already expressed in the
shortcoming of the NIH guidelines; that regulation can be
circumvented if companies use outside funding. The second is the
incentive created by allowing "functionally equivalent" biosafety
procedures. If the EPA's intent is to streamline authority by
covering mostly commercial and/or environmental trial chemical
substances and assign laboratory regulations predominantly to the
NIH, then it should not leave room for research labs to operate
outside of the latter's framework without providing more specific
standards. If the intent is to allow genetic engineering research to
occur outside of NIH funding, then the activities of garage
biohackers must be considered legal. This may be intentional to
encourage innovation, but the EPA cannot put its money where its
rules are. Without the ability to track the use of gene fragment
combinations and synthetic biology lab equipment, it would be
difficult for any organization to adequately monitor private
synthetic biology activity, let alone perform "functional
equivalence" analysis for every science garage operated by a
molecular biology undergrad with a centrifuge and a credit card.
Thus, it should not build this kind of safe-space into its rules.
To compensate for the EPA's inability to monitor the chemical
producers for which it is responsible, either one or both of the
following modification options should be pursued. The first is to
dedicate more resources to the EPA for careful monitoring of
companies engaging in synthetic biology production methods. A
dedicated staff of data collectors should be able to seek out
companies doing synthetic biology production and return
information on production methods to an internal EPA review
committee. The threat of research audits would encourage
companies to submit TERAs and MCANs. The second option is to
create financial incentives for companies to willingly provide the
EPA with research information. One example might be
carbon-offset subsidies in proportion to the potential "greening
effect" of safe synthetic cell-based chemical production.2 08 If the
208 To address the concerns specified in this Article, these standards for "safe"
synthetic biology practices would include proof of organism mutation control,
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new method demonstrates cleaner and less resource-intensive
production in comparison to conventional methods, the EPA can
issue certificates that provide tax breaks or direct subsidies.
Companies that willingly come forward in this way will allow the
EPA to verify the safety of the practice and, thus, reward those
companies for transparency and environmental friendliness. Both
options should be pursued, but because of financial constraints, the
latter should receive greater attention.
C. FDA and FDCA Modification
Because of the FDA's gatekeeper position, it should take a lead
role in the establishment of standards for synthetic biology
production practices. The secretary of the FDA should promulgate
two primary rules. The first should require manufacturers to
establish containment capability for the proposed synthetic
organism beyond a reasonable doubt in the development of foods,
drugs, biologics, and medical devices. This will require
demonstration of: (1) designed controls internal to the organism;
and (2) laboratory confinement measures. Internally designed
controls may include "kill switches," hyper-specific resource
requirements preventing cell survival outside of the lab, or natural
reproduction-cessation or reproduction-incapacity. Laboratory
confinement measures should include standards for sterilization,
quarantining, research access limitations during development, and
emergency shutdown and termination procedures. The second
primary rule should require synthetic biology producers to show
that their organisms will perform the desired function, whether as
process or as product, with reasonable certainty, without losing
substantial efficacy or developing unforeseeable pathogenic
attributes. These changes would be a result of mutation, which is
very difficult to control.209 The sections of the FDCA to which
protection of agricultural community resources, and proof of efficacy greater
than reasonable alternatives. These standards should be shared between NIH,
EPA, and FDA.
209 See Edward Cox, Bacterial Mutator Genes and the Control of Spontaneous
Mutation, 10 ANN. REv. GENET. 135, 135-56 (1976), available at
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.ge.10.120176.001031.
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these amendment rules can apply includes § 355-1(f)(1), which
allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services to "require that
the risk evaluation and mitigation strategy for a drug include such
elements as are necessary to assure safe use of the drug, because of
its inherent toxicity or potential harmfulness." 210 These
amendments can be supplemented by the FDA's continued support
of the NIH's guidelines for rDNA, including recognition of
uncertainty generated by unprecedented combinations of genes and
potentially synergistic effect of even those genes that are
considered well-understood.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Microorganisms controlled by laboratory synthesized DNA are
substantially similar to the cell products of gene splicing, but there
is a greater need for regulation because of increased uncertainty.
Although many transgenic organisms exhibit phenotypes mostly
consistent with their non-modified natural counterparts, organisms
controlled by synthetic genomes have not been observed over time.
As researchers move further away from the natural toward the
synthetic, they incur increasing responsibility for understanding
genetic expression and gene-environment interaction. The
development of synthetic cells as "living factories" must remain
behind scientific confidence in genetic understanding. This will
require dedicated oversight to ensure that profit motives do not
drive the industry prematurely into production, which could
compromise health and equal access.
While it is too optimistic to hope for new legislation specific to
the concerns produced by synthetic biology, it is not unreasonable
to require modifications of existing rDNA regulation. A basic
coordinated effort between three appropriate regulatory entities
would prevent a serious accident or malicious use of synthetic
biology. Each of the three agencies discussed should hone their
focus on one aspect of synthetic biology regulation: the NIH on
lab confinement and access to information, the EPA on
environmental release and commercial production, and the FDA on
210 See 21 U.S.C. § 355- (f)(1) (2006).
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human and other animal application products. Each should define
the boundaries of their roles by (1) adopting each other's standards
where appropriate and (2) delegating oversight tasks just outside of
their scope to the most appropriate counterpart without allowing
room for ambiguous "functional equivalence." Finally, the United
States should adopt an international presence of concern for
synthetic biology hazards by joining the Convention on Biological
Diversity and supporting the regulation of Living Modified
Organisms. These measures, if employed consistently and
thoroughly, will promote safe and advantageous development of
synthetic biology.
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